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Abstract: A puzzling piece of empirical evidence suggests that resource-abundant 
countries tend to grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts.  We attempt to explain 
this phenomenon by developing a lobbying game in which rent seeking firms interact with 
corrupt governments.  The presence or absence of political competition, as well as the 
potential costs of political transitions, turn out to be key elements in generating the 
‘resource curse.’  These variables define the degree of freedom that incumbent 
governments have in pursuing development policies that maximize surplus in the lobbying 
game, but put the economy off its optimal path.  We test our predictions by adding 
measures of democracy and authoritarianism to existing regression models of the resource 
curse, and obtain support for our hypotheses. 
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1. Introduction 
Conventional economic reasoning suggests that increasing a country’s stock of assets 
provides greater opportunities for economic development and should translate into more 
production.  A number of influential studies have recently cast doubt upon the validity of 
this axiom.  A substantial body of empirical evidence demonstrates an inverse relationship 
between natural resource endowments and economic growth, even when controlling for a 
wide variety of variables.  Assuming that the share of primary exports in GDP is a 
reasonable proxy for resource wealth,1 it has been shown that countries that are well 
endowed with natural resources tend to grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts 
(e.g., Sachs and Warner 1997, 2001; Auty 2001a).  To be precise; Sachs and Warner 
estimate that an increase of one standard deviation in natural resource intensity (on average 
16% of GNP) leads to a reduction of about 1 percent per year in economic growth. This 
phenomenon has been coined the resource curse hypothesis.   
Not surprisingly, this counterintuitive finding has motivated a vast and rapidly 
growing literature seeking to examine its robustness, and the precise conditions under 
which it obtains.  Theoretical explanations for the resource curse hypothesis now abound 
(see section 2). In this paper we focus on the key role played by corruption in linking 
resource abundance to economic growth – an angle that is appropriate in light of recent 
empirical work.  We formally model the interaction between agents from the private sector 
competing for favours from the government, but expand on earlier rent-seeking models by 
treating the government as an active player with its own objectives and constraints as well.  
We also extend the existing literature by introducing a political challenger, who threatens 
to oust the incumbent regulator.  In sum, we present a political-economy model that 
                                                 
1 Gylfason (2001) employs another proxy for resource wealth (namely the ratio of natural capital to total 
capital—or the sum of natural, human, and physical capital), and finds that the qualitative results are 
unaffected.  Stijns (2002), on the other hand, employs yet another measure (physical reserves) and finds that 
the curse disappears for resources other than land.  Norman (2005) challenges this finding.  We speculate that 
the econometrics of the curse will be an active area of research in the near future. 
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focuses on the effects of resource abundance on government decision-making, corruption 
and political incentives.  Our model identifies two key factors necessary for the resource 
curse hypothesis to hold: the absence of effective political competition and a set of specific 
technological production relationships in both the resource and the non-resource sectors.  
The model thus links the resource curse to the degree of democracy or authoritarianism in 
the economy.      
We test our theoretical conjectures using data from Sachs and Warner’s (1997) 
seminal study.  Our regression results support the main predictions emerging from the 
theoretical analysis.  First, the empirical evidence suggests that resources have a large, 
negative and significant effect on growth in highly autocratic countries, but that the effect 
of resources on growth in democratic regimes is either statistically insignificant, small and 
negative, or significant and positive, depending upon the measure of democracy that is 
used.  Secondly, we find that the main effect of resource abundance on growth occurs 
through interaction with political variables.  The results are robust to alternative 
specifications of the growth equation and measures of democracy. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarizes earlier 
work on the resource curse and places the current contribution within the rapidly expanding 
literature.  Section 3 outlines the structure of the model and summarizes certain properties 
of the equilibrium.  Section 4 presents the main predictions.  Section 5 specifies the 
empirical model and discusses the data and results, while Section 6 concludes.  Appendix 1 
provides proofs and Appendix 2 examines the robustness of the empirical results. 
 
2. Background: Explanations of the resource curse  
Why might resource-rich countries grow slower than resource-poor ones?  Early studies on 
the resource curse placed emphasis on declining terms of trade for primary products, and 
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on the failure of resource-abundant countries to develop a competitive manufacturing 
sector – the so-called Dutch Disease hypothesis.  A resource boom results in an 
appreciation of the exchange rate followed by a contraction of the tradable manufacturing 
sector.  In a related vein, Hausmann and Rigobon (2002) show how the tradable 
manufacturing sector might suffer from lack of investments because of the interplay 
between volatile resource returns and endogenous interest rates in imperfect capital 
markets.  A booming resource sector might also crowd out public and private investments 
in education or human capital (Gylfason 2001), or discourage entrepreneurship (Sachs and 
Warner 2001).  Thus a country’s ability to compete on world markets is eroded, reducing 
the potential for export-led growth in the long run.  These effects are re-enforced if the 
manufacturing sector is assumed to be the economy’s main ‘engine of growth’ in the long 
run; manufacturing is often associated with positive externalities and increasing returns to 
scale (e.g., Matsuyama 1992; Sachs and Warner 1999; Torvik 2002).   
Recent work by Leite and Weidmann (1999) casts doubt upon the validity of the 
Dutch disease story and related explanations.  When controlling for the level of corruption, 
Leite and Weidmann find that variables representing the export shares of fuels and ores 
(arguably the types of resources many analysts have in mind when thinking about the 
resource curse) are no longer significant in growth regressions.2  The resource curse 
appears to vanish when the resource variable is disaggregated into its components.  But this 
conclusion could be premature as Leite and Weidmann also show that resource wealth 
tends to stimulate corruption, and that corruption in turn negatively impacts on economic 
growth.  Hence, the curse may still hold for fuel and ores, but the effect may be indirect, 
through the level of corruption. 
                                                 
2 Leite and Weidmann break up the natural resources variable into 4 components; fuels, ores, agriculture and 
food.  While the variables for ores and fuels are not significant in the growth regression, the variable 
representing food export shares is significant and of the correct sign for the resource curse story. 
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An alternative stream of literature explores these corruption and political economy 
aspects, focusing on the rent seeking consequences of resource booms.  It is generally 
assumed that resource rents are easily appropriable by an established elite, triggering bribes 
and distorted policies. 3  Using a simple and incisive model, Torvik (2002) shows that 
resource abundance increases the payoffs from unproductive rent seeking behaviour and 
thus lowers overall growth of the economy.4 
Most of these models suggest a deterministic relation between resource 
endowments and economic performance.  But there appears to be not much that is 
deterministic about these links.  An overview of different case studies in Auty (2001a) 
demonstrates how complex and diverse the experiences of different countries are.  Notable 
exceptions to the resource curse hypothesis are found in both the developed and developing 
world, and include countries like Malaysia, Australia, Norway, Botswana and Canada.  
Unlike countries like Nigeria, Mexico and Venezuela, who appear to have squandered their 
oil windfalls, these countries have used their resources judiciously to build modern and 
successful economies.  These examples make clear that generalisations may at times be 
hazardous: there appears to be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ resource curse story.  A satisfactory 
explanation of the resource curse hypothesis must explain why resource abundance retards 
growth in some countries and promotes development in others (also see Mehlum et al. 
2002, Robinson et al. 2002). 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of the deleterious impact of corruption on growth through the effect on (foreign) 
investment, the productivity of public investment and level of maintenance expenditures, the level of 
education and health expenditures and tax revenues, see Tanzi (1998) and Leite and Weidmann (1999). For a 
model where a fixed number of rent seekers competes for capital by demanding re-distributive transfers 
(effectively treating the fiscal system as a common pool), eroding profitability and investments in the 
comparative productive formal sector of the economy, see Tornell and Lane (1999). 
4 In the model, rent seekers compete for a share of the public sector’s income that is acquired through 
resource sales and fixed-rate taxation of manufacturing. Individuals compare income from production (with 
increasing returns to scale) to income from rent seeking, and arbitrage away differentials between these 
occupations by entry and exit decisions.  A resource boom tilts the balance in favour of rent seeking.  As 
entrepreneurs switch from modern manufacturing, income and demand fall, as do profits for remaining 
entrepreneurs and existing rent seekers.  Production in manufacturing falls more than the increase in natural 
resource income, a result driven by the assumption of IRS in manufacturing.  Society as a whole is worse off. 
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There are two different sub-streams of the rent seeking literature that attempt to 
explain these diverging patterns of development in different countries.  First, there exists a 
class of models analysing rent seeking, entrepreneurship and multiple equilibria.  For 
example, Acemoglu (1995) and Baland and Francois (2000) demonstrate that multiple 
equilibria of unequal social desirability might materialise in a model where an endogenous 
number of rent seekers interacts with an endogenous number of entrepreneurs.5  Baland and 
Francois’ model is useful for interpreting the divergent effects of resource booms on 
economic growth.  Depending on whether the economy is initially located in a favourable 
or unfavourable equilibrium (with few and many rent seekers, respectively), increasing the 
value of the domestic resource stock might increase or decrease aggregate income.  
Mehlum et al. (2002) develop a similar argument by adding institutions to the analysis.  
Building on the ‘big push model’ of Murphy et al. (1989), they assume that returns to 
entrepreneurial activities and rent seeking are determined by the institutional context.  In 
so-called ‘grabber-friendly’ economies, resource booms trigger a move of labor from 
production to rent seeking at the detriment of aggregate growth—the curse materializes.  In 
countries with good institutions (‘producer-friendly economies’), instead, a resource boom 
boosts production.  There is no true policy maker in these ‘a-political models,’ although 
rents are created by some exogenously set policy and rent seekers may interact with some 
exogenous entity to secure a share of these rents.  The fact that there is no government to 
steer the development process, combined with the lack of foresight or true interaction 
between agents, implies that long-run outcomes are determined by initial conditions.   
The second explanation for the diverse effects of resource endowments on 
economic growth focuses on the insight that failure to appropriately manage resource rents 
                                                 
5 In Acemoglu’s model rent seekers prey on the income from entrepreneurs, such that an increase in the 
number of rent seekers lowers returns to both activities.  In contrast, Baland and Francois assume that 
entrepreneurs might undermine the returns to rent seeking (as domestic production might render rents from 
import quota increasingly valueless). 
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ultimately owes to bad policy choices.  That is; this explanation focuses on policy making 
explicitly. Auty (2001a,b) distinguishes between different development trajectories, and 
argues that resource-rich countries (especially those characterized by so-called ‘point 
resources’ like oil fields) tend to be dominated by factional and predatory oligarchic 
policies, promoting narrow sectional interests.  The resource curse occurs because 
resource-rich countries are more likely to have ‘bad policies’—policies postponing the 
transition to competitive industrialisation and diversification of the economy.  As a result, 
the resource sector supports a burgeoning non-tradable sector made up of infant industries 
and an inflated but unproductive public sector.  While this line of argument contains many 
interesting observations, regularities and assertions, formal modelling appears to have 
lagged behind discursive and statistical analyses.  The only exception we are aware of is a 
political model by Robinson et al. (2002), where the focus is on an incumbent politician 
who receives all resource rents and who might distort the allocation of labor between the 
private and public sector to generate political support and retain office.   
In this paper we combine elements from these different approaches and develop a 
model that combines rent seeking firms with a corrupt and strategically acting government.  
We do not develop a growth model per se, but analyse the allocation of supporting 
government policies over competing groups in society (which in turn will affect growth).  
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), policies are exchanged for bribes.  Because the 
incentive to bribe is determined by the stock of resources, the institutional context, at least 
when proxied by the level of corruption, is endogenous in our model.  Resource wealth 
might slow down economic growth because it sets the stage for a situation where policy 
makers are bribed more intensively to provide a socially sub-optimal set of public goods.  
But there is nothing deterministic about this outcome.  Our theory predicts that, in 
autocratic regimes, resource endowments allow governments to extract greater surplus 
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(bribes) by pursuing policies that are detrimental to growth.  However, the desire to retain 
power implies that these incentives are greatly attenuated when the regime faces strong 
political opposition.  Thus, in democratic regimes, the surpluses available from resource 
endowments are more likely to be used in ways that promote welfare and growth. 
 
3. The model 
Consider a small open economy with three productive sectors: natural resources (R), 
manufacturing (M) and constant returns to scale agriculture (A).  There are a given number 
of entrepreneurs in society, denoted N, and they are free to move between the resource and 
manufacturing sectors: N = NR + NM.  In addition, there is a labor force of L people, which 
is perfectly mobile over all three sectors: L = LR + LM + LA.  Define LR=NRlR and 
LM=NMlM, where lR and lM are the number of  workers hired by firms in sectors R and M 
respectively.  Prices of goods are determined in world markets and exogenous in the model.  
We denote the returns to labor in agriculture by w, so that for interior solutions wages are 
equal to w in all sectors.  In what follows we assume this is the case. 
Inputs in production in the R and M sectors include labor and a sector-specific input 
in the form of a semi-public good, provided by the government.  In the resource sector, 
another input is obviously the in situ resource stock, but this is captured as a simple shift 
parameter in what follows.  The government is assumed to be self-interested and 
maximizes its own utility, and producers can influence the supply of public inputs by 
paying political contributions or bribes to the government.  But there are limits to the 
ability of the government to pursue its own limited interests as it must worry about losing 
office as well—there is a rival that threatens to take the government’s place if its policies 
are too different from the public’s interests.6  Regardless of the form of government, the 
                                                 
6  We define this constraint more precisely in the following section. 
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incumbent rulers face a trade-off between distorting policies for personal gain and 
tempering the distortions when faced with the credible threat of losing power. 
 The model is based on the following sequence of events.  First, entrepreneurs 
decide which sector to enter (resource extraction or manufacturing).  Second, political 
interaction takes place between the incumbent government and the lobby groups.  This 
stage is analogous to the game described in Grossman and Helpman (1994).  Specifically, 
each lobby group simultaneously offers the incumbent government a political contribution 
schedule.  A lobby’s strategy consists of a continuous function that maps every policy 
vector that the government might choose into a specific political contribution or bribe.  
Given knowledge of the lobby groups’ strategies (i.e. contribution schedules), the 
government proceeds to set its optimal policies in Stage 3.7  Observing this, in stage 4 a 
rival announces the policies it will implement if it could secure power in the following 
stage.  A political contest takes place, and the party that wins implements the announced 
policies.  Once policies have been set, production occurs by choice of labor in stage 5.8 
When the government goes unchallenged the equilibrium of the game has the 
properties of the well-known common agency problem, where several participants 
(lobbyists) seek to influence the actions of a common agent (the government).  The 
equilibrium in this case is defined by: (i) a set of contribution schedules that maximises the 
payoffs of each lobby group, taking as given the rival lobby group’s schedule and the 
anticipated optimisation of the government; and (ii) a set of policies that maximises the 
                                                 
7  As outlined below, we focus on equilibria where the incumbent exploits his first mover advantage and is 
able to retain power.  Firms know this, and offer bribes in the second stage. 
8 We have assumed that the lobbies do not contribute to any challenger.  Although we recognise that this is a 
simplification, the available evidence from the US provides reasonable support for this assumption.  For 
instance, Magelby and Nelson (1990, p 56) report that PACs gave more than 80% of their contributions to 
incumbents. They conclude that contributions are given to influence policies of incumbents, rather than for 
electoral purposes.  While similar evidence from non-democratic regimes is unavailable, it seems likely that 
in these countries too contributions will be paid mainly to incumbents since support for the opposition is 
typically either deemed subversive or illegal.  Furthermore in highly unstable regimes the identity of the 
challenger may not be known in advance.  
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government’s payoffs, taking the contribution schedules into account.  For a detailed proof 
see Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
 
3.1 The resource and manufacturing sectors 
The production function of firms in sector x = M, R is: 
(1) Qx = fx(lx, Bx),  fi > 0, fij > 0 (i,j = Lx, Bx and i≠j).  
Goods are produced using labour lx and a publicly supplied input Bx (x = R, M) and, as 
mentioned, we treat the resource stock as a shift parameter in the production function of the 
resource sector.  For manufacturing, BM, public investments possibly represent investments 
in human capital or sector-specific technologies.  For resource extraction, BR, public 
investments may represent investments in infrastructure to ‘open up’ isolated areas, etc.—
see Repetto and Gillis (1988) for an overview of government policies to support the 
logging industry and Karl (1997) for examples relevant for the oil industry.  In what 
follows we assume diminishing returns in resource extraction (fii<0), and increasing returns 
at the sector level in manufacturing.  In other words, as argued by Matsuyama (1992), 
Murphy et al. (1989), Torvik (2002) and others we assume there are external benefits from 
entrepreneurs moving into manufacturing.  Of course individual entrepreneurs ignore these 
spillover effects in their private decision-making. 
 We model resource extraction as an activity that generates a certain output per 
period (depending on relative prices, policies and stock size).  It can either be assumed that 
entrepreneurs enter a large conglomorate (and become rent seekers rather than benefit from 
their entrepreneurial talents) and jointly decide on optimal management, or more generally 
that entrepreneurs start up new firms, claim a fraction of the resource stock, and extract 
from their private sub-stock.  For simplicity we deal with the former case though the results 
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are unaffected by this assumption.  Profits per entrepreneur in the resource sector are 
obtained by ‘dividing the pie’ consisting of the associated resource rents, and is defined by: 
(2) ,R
RRR
R
N
SwlpQ τπ −−−=  
where p is the price of the resource commodity, SR is the (aggregate) bribe offered by the 
resource sector and τ is a tax levied by the government to finance the provision of public 
goods.  Without loss we assume that all firms pay taxes but, alternatively and without loss, 
we can also assume that all agents in the economy (L+N) pay taxes.  The optimal behavior 
of entrepreneurs in the resource sector in stages 2 (choosing the optimal bribe) and 5 
(hiring the optimal amount of labor) follow directly from this expression:9 
(3) w
l
Qp
N
wlQp
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R
R
R
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R
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∂→=−∂∂= 0)/(π   (Stage 5), and 
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∂
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1π          (Stage 2). 
From these first order conditions, not surprisingly, it follows directly that dlR/dp > 0, 
dlR/dBR > 0 and dSR/dp > 0.  From (4): lobbying will only occur if further provision of the 
publicly supplied input is profitable to the producer.10  We assume this is the case: 
p(∂QR/∂BR) – w(∂lR/∂BR) > 0, so that (4) defines an interior solution only if (∂SR/∂BR) > 0 – 
lobbying only occurs if higher political contributions induce the government to provide 
more of the input (which is evident).  Note that equation (4) implies that, in equilibrium, 
the change in political contribution mirrors the effects of the policy on profits.11,12  
                                                 
9  For expositional ease solutions are presented by agent rather than by sequence of events.  However, all 
downstream impacts are incorporated into the solutions as appropriate. 
10  With a potentially large number of firms in the economy the possible increase in the individual’s tax 
burden arising from a rise in Bx is assumed to be negligible. Producers ignore the impact of their lobbying on 
their tax burden. Relaxing this assumption complicates the analysis but does not alter the main conclusions. 
11 Thus, as noted by Grossman and Helpman (1994), the political contribution schedule is locally truthful.  As 
in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), this concept can be extended to a contribution schedule that is globally 
truthful.  This yields a function which accurately mirrors the preferences of the lobbyist's at all policy points. 
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 Next, turn to the manufacturing sector, which consists of NM = N–NR independent 
firms, but which, as mentioned above, is characterized by sector-wide increasing returns to 
scale. Profits per entrepreneur are given by: 
(5) τπ −−+−−= −MMMMMM QNswlQ )1( , 
where sM are bribes per firm in manufacturing such that aggregate bribes paid by this sector 
are given by SM = NMsM, and where sector-wide scale economies are captured in a simple 
and straightforward way by the term (NM-1)Q-M (Q-M is the output of other firms in the 
sector).  Since there are scale economies in manufacturing this structure implies that in the 
first best allocation there would be a single firm in the resource sector, with all other agents 
engaged in manufacturing.  However, as explained in subsequent sections, this outcome 
cannot be achieved by the government who sets policies after entrepreneurs have chosen 
which sector to enter.13  
We assume that firms determine their bribes independently.  This assumption seems 
reasonable if the manufacturing sector contains a large and disparate number of firms (e.g. 
Olsen 1965).  We treat the price of the manufactured good as the numeraire.  Optimal firm 
behavior follows from profit function (5): 
(6) w
l
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wlQ
dl
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M
M
M
MM
M =∂
∂→=−∂∂= 0/π    (Stage 5), and 
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From (7) follows the aggregate bribe: SM = NMsM (where NM is endogenously determined – 
see below).  As above, bribing occurs until marginal benefits equal marginal costs, and (7) 
is locally truthful.  This outcome may be compared to the optimal bribe ( MSˆ ) when firms 
                                                                                                                                                    
12  It is useful to note that in this case, even if bribes were determined individually rather than jointly, the 
same solution eventuates.  That is the optimal individual bribe is simply sR = SR/NR.  
13  The first best allocation of entrepreneurial talent over sectors likely involves an unequal return to talent 
(with the entrepreneur in resource extraction earning more than her colleagues in manufacturing).  Such profit 
differentials cannot persist in our model and will be competed away by entry-exit decisions. 
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in the manufacturing sector collectively angle for government support – internalising the 
spillover benefits from production: 
(7’) 01ˆˆ)1(ˆˆ =−∂
∂
∂
∂−∂
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∂
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∂
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B
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It is apparent that MMM sNS >ˆ .  Finally, differentiating (7) or (4) gives the result that: 
(8) 0== M
R
R
M
dS
dS
dS
dS . 
In other words, the reaction curves are orthogonal and one sector’s bribe has no effect on 
the optimal bribe in the other sector.14 
 
3.2 The government 
We model the case of a selfish government caring only about its private returns.  
Alternatively, and without loss, we may consider the case where the government 
maximizes a linear function with exogenous weights given to both contributions and 
welfare (see Grossman and Helpman 1994).15  The incumbent government’s payoffs from 
retaining power are defined by: 
(9)  Ug = NMsM + NRsR + H + D 
where H is the intrinsic utility, if any, arising from holding office, and D = Nτ - CM(BM) – 
CR(BR) is the fiscal surplus as Ci(Bi) denote the costs associated with providing semi-public 
good i (we assume convex costs: C′>0, C′′>0).  Bribes and fiscal surpluses are valued since 
                                                 
14 We have also solved a more complex model without an agricultural sector where wages are set 
endogenously.  With the R and M sector competing for labor, rivalry in bribing implies that political 
contributions are strategic substitutes: dSR/dSM < 0.  Intuitively, an increase in political contributions, SM, 
induces a greater supply of the public good BM, so that output in sector M expands and equilibrium wages 
rise.  Ceteris paribus, higher wages reduce the profitability of production in sector R.  Since political 
donations are truthful and reflect the payoffs from a policy change (eq. 4b), contributions from sector R 
decline.  Incorporating this effect would strengthen the results we derive below (albeit at the expense of 
additional algebraic clutter).  Details are available from the authors on request. 
15  However in our model the relative weight that is eventually given to welfare is shown to depend on the 
intensity of political competition.  Thus we take a small step towards endogenising the relative weights in the 
Grossman-Helpman (1994) formulation of the government objective function. 
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they represent discretionary funds that can be used for any purposes – personal or political 
– that the government chooses.  These funds could be used to deter political rivals, suppress 
opposition, fund election campaigns, or embezzled for personal consumption.   Without 
loss we assume that when the government loses office its utility is normalised to zero.   
Let (BM,BR,T) be the set of policies proposed by the government, and let 
W(BM,BR,T) be the resulting income level, or the sum of profits plus aggregate labor 
income:   
(10) W = NRπR + (N–NR)πM + wL. 
Upon substitution: 
(10’) W = NR pQR + (N–NR)QM +wLA - Nτ.  
We assume that the income level that eventuates affects political support.  This assumption 
is plausible if the entrepreneurial class (whose profits feature prominently in the income 
measure) has a large influence on what happens in society.  Alternatively, it is plausible if a 
broader group of people cares about aggregate income or expects some of it to “trickle 
down” (say, though fiscal policies not modelled here).  While we do not model the trickle 
down effects this assumption seems highly plausible in the light of accumulating evidence 
that increases in private income remains an efficient and durable way for countries to 
eliminate poverty and develop (e.g. Dollar and Kraaij 2002, Bulte et al. 2005, Kraaij 2004).  
In addition, being closely related to GDP, the formulation of income in (10’) generates 
predictions that are more amenable to empirical scrutiny.  
 
3.3 The challenger and a threat of revolution 
Incumbent leaders seldom govern without the potential threat of being challenged.  The 
survival of a government is threatened when it is no longer able to garner sufficient 
resources either to sustain political support through its policies, or subdue political 
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opposition.  Thus to retain office, incumbents must be attentive to the pressures they face 
from opponents (see Mesquita et al. 2003).     
It is assumed that a single challenger who, having observed the government’s 
policies, announces the policy vector ( RM BB , ,T). Let the corresponding aggregate 
welfare level be ),,( TBBW RM .  We adopt two crucial assumptions about the political 
process.  First, it is assumed that the transition of power from the incumbent to the 
challenger is more likely to occur if such a transition gains greater public support.  We 
interpret this as follows; a transition is more likely to occur (that is; be supported) if it 
raises aggregate income.  This assumption seems reasonable in the light of evidence that 
economic growth remains a robust way of delivering development benefits.16 
Second, we assume that political transitions are not without costs.  In non-
democratic regimes the transition of power usually takes the form of revolutions and 
violent political struggles that disrupt economic activity and impose substantial costs on 
citizens. By contrast, in democracies the electoral process provides a (relatively) low cost 
and orderly opportunity for the transfer of power.  The transition of power in a non-
democratic regime imposes higher economic costs than in a democracy.  It is assumed that 
the greater are the discretionary resources available to the incumbent, the greater will be its 
ability to resist a regime change.  This is likely since discretionary funds can be used to 
deter or suppress opposition either by force, or through persuasive propaganda.17  This 
                                                 
16  In the context of democratic societies, the above interpretation is perhaps obvious as raising aggregate 
income offers scope to make voters better off as the benefits of growth spread across the economy. In non-
democratic societies, it is probably also true that popular support raises the odds of a successful coupe d’état, 
and increasing income could provide the means to ensure popular support.  Sutter (2000) provides an 
analytical study of the determinants of rebellion.  For a survey of related issues see Hardin (1997) and 
Tullock (1978). 
17  See Grossman and Helpman (1996) for a model of political advertising.  More importantly it is worth 
noting that the notion that costs of transition are higher in (i) autocratic regimes and (ii) where the 
government has greater resources at its disposal is not new in the political science literature.  Some political 
economy studies have also explored this issue.  For instance, Wintrobe (1978) discusses how autocrats use 
resources for repression and internal security in order to increase the costs of regime change and hence quell 
opposition.  Tullock’s (1978) review of autocracies provides further support.  
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imposes larger costs on the inhabitants when a regime change occurs.  Let v(SM+SR+D) 
denote the welfare costs of a change in regime.  We assume that v’>0 and v”=0.18  
From these two assumptions it follows that a change in regime will be income 
improving (and will thus occur) if the following holds: 
(11)     W( TBB RM ,, ) < ),,( TBBW RM  – v(SM + SR + D). 
We adopt the convention that when (11) holds as an equality, the incumbent retains 
power. To determine when (11) is satisfied it is necessary to first derive the opposition’s 
optimal policy vector. To do so define the welfare maximising set of policies as: 
),,( *** TBB RM=Λ  with corresponding welfare maximising level of welfare W*(Λ*).  
Given any set of policies of the incumbent ( RM BB , ) with associated welfare level 
W( RM BB , ), the rival can secure power by proposing a set of policies that yields aggregate 
utility level: 
(12) W( RM BB , )+ v(SM + SR) + ε1 ( )W≡ Λ , 
for all ε1 > 0.  Condition (12) implies that the benefits of a regime change exceed the costs 
of the transition and there will be a change in government.  
Knowing this, in stage 1 the incumbent will seek to retain power by setting policies 
that yield welfare of 2( )W εΛ + , where ε2  > 0.  Ultimately, the incumbent as first mover 
knows that for any given policy vector Λi that it sets, the rival can seize power by offering 
policies that yield utility ( )i iW v εΛ + +  (εi > 0).  So long as such policies exist, there will 
be a regime change.  To retain power, the incumbent must set policies such that a regime 
change does not confer a net welfare gain.  Intuitively, “Bertrand” type of competition in 
policies implies that the incumbent can only retain power if the opposition is required to 
                                                 
18  We present results for the simpler case of linear costs, but the results are also consistent with convex costs. 
 17
offer policies that yield greater net utility than is available at the welfare maximising set of 
policies: 
(13)     W( RM BB , )+ v(SM + SR) *)(* Λ≥W . 
Observe that as v rises the government has more freedom to set policies that deviate 
from the welfare maximising ideal ( *)(* Λ≥W ) – costly transitions generate slack that the 
incumbent can exploit to his own benefit.  In oppressive regimes with no effective 
opposition or, more specifically, when the transition costs v(⋅) are sufficiently large to quell 
any form of opposition, equation (13) will hold as a strict inequality.  In countries with high 
levels of political competition (13) will hold as an equality.   
 
3.4. Policy making 
Recall that the government moves after entrepreneurs have allocated effort between sectors 
in Stage 1.19  Formally, the government determines its optimal policies, taking as given the 
distribution of firms between sectors.  The government’s optimum choices are thus 
constrained by the first mover advantage enjoyed by the entrepreneurs and hence the first 
best distribution of firms between sectors cannot generally be induced through government 
support for different sectors.  Rather, second-best or constrained welfare maximization may 
be pursued. 
First we consider the (constrained) welfare maximizing policy without bribing.  
Maximizing (10), but without Si(Bi) and imposing Nτ = CB(BM) + CR(BR), gives the 
following conditions for an optimal allocation: 
(14) ,0)( =∂
∂+∂
∂−∂
∂= R
A
R
RR
R
R
R
R B
Lw
B
BC
B
QpN
dB
dW  and 
                                                 
19 Assuming that firm migration takes place in stage 1 seems reasonable since the choice of sector is likely to 
be a longer term decision, where as production levels or policy support are more easily altered in the short 
run.  Thus in determining the choice of sector, firms can be expected to anticipate and take account of policy 
responses and other downstream impacts.  
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Next, turn to policy making by a selfish incumbent planner, who tries to fend off a 
challenger.  To retain office the incumbent must propose policies to maximise (9), subject 
to the constraints: 
 (i)  W(BM,BR) ≥ ),( RM BBW  – v(SM + SR + D),20 
 (ii) )(),( WWRM WBBW Λ= .   
The necessary (Kuhn Tucker) conditions of the government’s problem in (9) are: 
 0x
L
B
∂ ≤∂ , 0
x
x
LB
B
∂ =∂ ; 0,0 =∂
∂≥∂
∂
λλλ
LL  (x = M, R), 
where L is the Langrangean and λ is the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (i).  Using the 
first order conditions above, we obtain after some substitution:  
(16) R
A
R
R
R
R
R B
Lw
B
Cv
B
S
B
L
∂
∂+∂
∂−+∂
∂=∂
∂ λλ )'1( , and 
(17) ,)()'1( M
M
M
M
R
M
A
M
M
M
M
M Q
Q
B
QNN
B
Lw
B
Cv
B
S
B
L
∂
∂
∂
∂−+∂
∂+∂
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∂=∂
∂ −λλλ  
and the constrain again.  Recall λ=0 when constraint (i) is slack in a regime with very high 
transition costs (little or no political opposition). 
It is instructive to compare the policies that emerge under (constrained) income 
maximization with those that occur in an autocracy – i.e. those that occur when the 
incumbent is unconstrained by potential challengers such that λ=0.  Let BR*, BM* be the 
amounts of public goods supplied to sectors R and M respectively in the income 
maximising equilibrium and define BRa, BMa as the public goods supplies under autocracy.  
                                                 
20 It may be more reasonable to state this constraint in terms of probabilities. That is; the probability of 
retaining power is Pr = Pr (Φ) where Φ =(W(BM,BR) -[ ),( RM BBW – v(NMSM + NRSR)]) and Pr’ > 0 ; Pr” 
< 0, Pr(Φ <0) = 0.  For simplicity this is ignored. 
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Lemma 1 compares the outcome in the two equilibria, holding the number of firms in each 
sector constant. 
Lemma 1: For a given number of firms, the level of government support to the 
manufacturing sector under autocracy is less than the level of support given in the 
income maximising equilibrium.  The level of support to the resource sector is 
unaffected by the type of regime when the number of firms is fixed.  BR*  = BRa and   
BM* > BMa.  
Proof:  See Appendix. 
Hence the manufacturing sector is relatively disadvantaged in an autocratic regime, while 
the resource sector continues to receive the same level of support, when the number of 
firms is fixed.  Intuitively, the government is assumed to be completely self-interested and 
in an autocratic regime policies are guided by the desire to extract bribes from firms.  The 
bribe paid by each firm reflects the private benefits that accrue to it from the public good.  
Firms in the manufacturing sector therefore ignore the sector wide returns to scale in 
determining their bribes and hence pay less than is collectively optimal and consequently 
receive fewer public goods. Since the supply of public goods in an autocratic regime differs 
from the income maximising levels, it necessarily follows that aggregate income levels 
under autocracy, must be lower than that in an income maximising regime.  Moreover, 
since the definition of income used in this model proxies GDP, this suggests that: 
Corollary 1: For any given number of firms in each sector, aggregate income levels 
and GDP in an autocracy will be lower than in the (constrained) income maximising 
equilibrium.  
How does political competition affect this outcome – i.e. what policies eventuate when λ > 
0?  It was noted above that, in the absence of policy competition, the government supplies 
public goods to each sector up to the point where the marginal benefits in the form of 
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increased political contributions equal the marginal cost of public good provision.  
However, political competition forces the government to take account of the welfare effects 
of its policy on other agents.  Moreover, the weight given to these welfare effects is 
declining in v’ – the marginal cost of regime change.  It follows that if greater provision of 
a public good to sector x = M,R, generates a net welfare loss upon other agents, an 
incumbent who wishes to retain power is compelled to lower supply of the public good to 
that sector and vice-versa.  In short, political competition is the channel through which the 
influence of special interest lobby groups can be attenuated.  But as the costs of political 
change (v) rise, the potentially beneficial impact of political competition diminishes.  Thus 
governments act rationally.  They extract greater surplus through policy distortions when 
secure, and retract towards the income maximising equilibrium when challenged by an 
opponent.  More formally as the political costs of a transition decline (i.e. v → 0), then the 
solution in (16) and (17) converges to the income maximizing equilibrium.  Hence, income 
levels (GDP) decline as political regimes become more autocratic. 
These results are based on the assumption that the number of firms in each sector is 
fixed.  In the following section we consider the impact of the movement of entrepreneurs 
between sectors. 
 
3.5 Entrepreneurs choose a sector 
In stage 1 of the model entrepreneurs choose between entering the manufacturing 
and resource extraction sector, taking account of all downstream impacts.  Their entry 
decisions will arbitrage away any profit differentials on the margin, and in equilibrium the 
following must hold: 
(18) 0)1( =−−−−−−+−−≡ − R
RRRR
MMMMM
N
NSwLpQQNswlQZ ττ . 
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Total differentiation gives us the unsurprising result that, in equilibrium, the number of 
entrepreneurs in the resource sector is increasing in the relative price of the resource 
commodity (see Appendix): 
(19) / 0.
/
R
R
dN Z p
dp Z N
∂ ∂= − >∂ ∂  
How does this equilibrium compare to the case without bribing, or the constrained income-
maximizing outcome?   The arbitrage equilibrium without bribes is characterized by the 
condition: 
(20) 0)1(* =−−−−−+−≡ − R
RRR
MMMM
N
NwLpQQNwlQZ ττ , 
which is simply the earlier condition (18) but where bribes are omitted (sM = SR = 0).  Once 
again it is evident that 
*
*
* / 0.
* /
R
R
dN Z p
dp Z N
∂ ∂= − >∂ ∂  
 
4. Results 
There are a number of ways to analyse the effect of resource endowments on economic 
growth.  The key feature we are interested in concerns the effect of resource abundance on 
the setting of policies in political equilibrium.  One straightforward approach would be to 
link provision of public goods BM and BR to the size of the resource stock X, which would 
be a shift parameter in resource extraction.  However, we have chosen a slightly different 
avenue that allows us to leave the production functions unspecified.  Consistent with the 
‘resource boom’ analysis of Baland and Francois (2000) and others, we model a resource 
boom as an exogenous increase in the price of good p.  Note that for any multiplicative 
production function, where QR=a(LR)b(BR)cX and ∏R=pQR, the analytical results with 
respect to the size of the (exogenous) resource stock are similar to the results with respect 
to the resource price.  Therefore, while strictly analysing the impact of relative prices on 
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policies and growth, the results spill over to the case of resource endowments and growth 
for most common production functions. 
In analysing the effect of a resource boom on policies, we consider two cases.  First, 
it is assumed that the government faces no potential challenger (λ=0).  This scenario will 
be referred to as autocracy in what follows.  Second, it is assumed that the government 
knows that there is a challenger waiting to take over, such that constraint (i) in problem (9) 
binds with equality.  The main result of the autocracy case is in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. In the absence of an immediate political challenger, a resource boom 
induces greater provision of public goods to sector R and less to the manufacturing 
sector.  The net result is a decline in private sector income (GDP). 
Proof: see appendix 1. 
The interpretation is as follows.  Under autocratic leadership, prior to a resource boom, a 
suboptimal allocation of policies is in effect.  The boom – modelled either as a rise in the 
resource price or an increase in the stock – aggravates the pre-existing inefficiencies.  It 
induces a transfer of support to the resource sector, at the expense of policies supporting 
the manufacturing sector.  The manufacturing sector, which benefits from network effects 
or spillover benefits, gets squeezed.  Relative to the first-best benchmark, too much support 
is given to the booming resource sector at the expense of manufacturing and policies are 
steered away from their most productive use.   
The reason why this occurs is that a resource ‘boom’ raises the value of government 
support for the resource sector at the margin, and therefore raises the level of bribes offered 
to the incumbent.21  Thus profits in the resource sector increase, attracting entrepreneurs 
from the manufacturing sector to restore equilibrium.  Since there are spillover benefits in 
                                                 
21 In a related but different vein, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) have established that thicker resource stocks are 
associated with strife and social war.  While formal war is ruled out in the model above, we do note that 
thicker stocks are consistent with more lobby effort for scarce resources and therefore more competition. 
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the manufacturing sector it follows that a shrinking manufacturing sector lowers 
manufacturing profits.  And since bribes are truthful, firms in the manufacturing sector will 
downscale their contribution schedule.  In the absence of a credible political rival, the 
incumbent government’s policies are guided by bribes and inducements rather than welfare 
considerations.  Hence, the incumbent has no incentive to compensate the manufacturing 
sector for the loss of production externalities, and sectoral policies favor the resource 
industry at the expense of manufacturing.  The resource curse materializes.22   
But this result need not always hold in this model.  Proposition 2 summarises the 
main result for the case when there exists political opposition. 
Proposition 2. When the political constraint binds the effects of a resource boom are 
ambiguous.  Income levels (GDP) may either increase or decrease following a 
resource boom. 23 
In other words, excessive (inefficient) levels of support for the resource sector may not be 
forthcoming if there is a political constraint that disciplines the incumbent, effectively 
forcing it to support other sectors if those raise income.   
 The economic explanation for the ambiguous result in the presence of political 
opposition is as follows.  Following a resource boom the ‘constrained’ planner expects 
additional bribing from the resource sector, resulting in an incentive to cater to this sector.  
However, doing so results in an income loss (as established above) while at the same time 
the potential level of income that can be promised by the challenger (offering a constrained 
income-maximizing policy package), has gone up.  The incumbent essentially has two 
ways to mitigate the risk of being ousted.  First, she may raise the costs of a regime change 
                                                 
22 Note that a similar result may be obtained in a standard Grossman-Helpman (1994) model where the 
incumbent cares about both bribes and welfare (‘balanced’ with a fixed weight in the government’s objective 
function).  Also note that the effect discussed in the main text would be accentuated in a model with 
endogenous wages.  If a resource boom bids up wages, profits in manufacturing fall with an adverse effect on 
that sector’s willingness to pay bribes. 
23  Formally this result follows from the fact that in the equilibrium where the constraint binds dBM/dp > (<) 0 
– hence the outcome is ambiguous. 
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– a viable strategy if the additional transfers flowing from the resource sector are 
sufficiently large.  Or, second, through choice of subsidies she may reverse the incentives 
of entrepreneurs to move from manufacturing to resource extraction.  That is: by providing 
more manufacturing-specific public good she counteracts the relative improvement of 
profitability of extraction, restoring the (constrained) optimal balance of entrepreneurial 
talent over the two sectors.  Which approach yields greater private benefits for the 
incumbent depends on parameters. 
To sum up, the resource curse emerges when the incumbent can effectively 
suppress all credible opposition to its policies (proposition 1).  In addition, the resource 
curse might emerge in the presence of political opposition, but only under specific 
conditions (proposition 2).  Indeed, the opposite result can also occur – a resource boom 
might induce policy improvements.  In a competitive political system, the credible threat of 
losing power compels the incumbent to trade off the income costs of a policy change 
against the private (bribe related) benefits.   
 
5. Empirical evidence 
Ultimately the validity of these theoretical predictions must depend upon the empirical 
evidence. In this section we therefore briefly review some of the relevant empirical 
evidence and provide an indirect (and albeit imperfect) test of the theory.  Beginning with 
the empirical validity of the key predictions of the model.  First, given the appropriate 
context, we argue that thicker resource stocks will translate into more corruption.  This is 
consistent with results reported by Leite and Weidmann (1999).  Second, we show that in 
autocracies more corruption implies a lower level of provision of (semi) public goods that 
do not directly favour the resource sector.  This is confirmed by Deacon (2003) who 
showed that the supply of welfare improving public goods is increasing in the level of 
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democracy.  Finally, we note that the extent of corruption distorts the set of policies chosen 
by the government, with detrimental effects for economic performance.  This is consistent 
with a variety of studies, including Leite and Weidmann (1999). 
 Our theory predicts that resource endowments allow governments to pursue policies 
that are detrimental to GDP in autocratic regimes, but that the effect will be mitigated or 
even reversed in democratic systems.  However, empirically testing this prediction is 
difficult for two reasons.  First, democratic status is not exogenous to income levels and is 
highly correlated with income (Minier 1998).  In addition, disentangling the direction of 
causality between these is complex and a matter of much contention. Some commentators 
argue that democratisation is a necessary condition for development,24 while others suggest 
that development precedes democracy.  Thus, as noted by Durham (1999), including 
democracy (autocracy) as an explanatory variable in a regression with the level of GDP as 
the dependent variable, could induce endogeneity bias in the regression.25  Instead we 
attempt to indirectly test the theoretical predictions by examining the relationship between 
GDP growth rates, resources and democracy, closely following the approach of Sachs and 
Warner (1997).  Recent work by Durham (1999) suggests that treating political regimes in 
growth regressions as exogenous is appropriate, and that it is income levels rather than 
growth rates that affect regime types (see also Barro 1996).26  We proceed by including 
measures of the degree of democracy or autocracy using the regression equations and data 
of Sachs and Warner (1997).  In other words, we follow the mainstream approach to testing 
resource curse theories, and do a straightforward cross-country regression analysis. 
                                                 
24  For instance, this is the position adopted by the World Bank in the World Development Report 2003. 
25  Regrettably there do not seem to be any obvious instruments that can be used to overcome the potential 
endogeneity problem.  
26 Further problems may arise with the use of a single equation regression if resource endowments influence 
the type of political regime that eventuates.  In the Appendix we report correlation coefficients between 
democracy measures and resource abundance.  These don’t demonstrate any statistical relationship. 
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Finding appropriate measures of democracy and autocracy at the cross-national 
level is difficult.  In the political science literature democracy (autocracy) is usually defined 
in terms of political and institutional attributes of a regime.  This is reflected in the two 
main measures of democracy that are available: the Polity data of Marshall and Jaggers 
(2003) and Vanhanen’s (2000) Polyarchy index.27 For our purposes the most suitable 
measure is provided by the Polity data of Marshall and Jaggers (but see Appendix 2, where 
we provide results based on the Vanhanen index as a robustness check).  Marshall and 
Jaggers provide separate measures of the democratic and autocratic attributes of each 
country, which allows us to directly test for possible differences in the impact of resources 
across democratic and autocratic characteristics.  Democracy is measured by an additive 
ten-point scale, with a score of ten being given to the most democratic system and zero to 
the least democratic.  The democracy attributes include: the competitiveness of political 
participation, the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of executive 
recruitment and constraints on the chief executive.  The autocratic attributes are also 
measured on a ten-point scale, with a score of ten being given to the most autocratic.  The 
autocratic attributes include proxies for: the lack of political competition, the regulation of 
political participation, lack of openness of executive recruitment and lack of constraints on 
the chief executive.    
Our theoretical analysis predicts that the impact of resources on policies is 
conditional upon the type of political regime.  Moreover, if growth depends upon policy 
choices, then countries with “good” policies can be expected to grow faster than those with 
distorted policies.  This suggests that that when resources become available in autocractic 
regimes this unleashes extreme forms of rent seeking and growth depleting policies, while 
in democratic regimes the outcome is ambiguous and resource rents may (or may not) 
                                                 
27  Freedom House also provide a proxy for democracy.  However, their index is a subjective measure of civic 
and political freedoms, which, it is argued, is related to the level of democracy.  For the measures required in 
this study the Freedom House index seems to be the least appropriate measure. 
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induce growth-increasing outcomes.  The separate measures of autocracy and democracy 
provided in the polity data set provide a reasonable vehicle for testing these predictions and 
are therefore used in the empirical analysis.  
 
Table 1: Regression results (t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Regression 
1 
Regression 
2 
Regression 
3 
Regression 
4 
Regression 
5 
Initial income level -1.82** 
(-8.79) 
-1.74** 
(-8.89) 
-1.69** 
(-8.66) 
-1.69** 
(-8.01) 
-1.49** 
(-6.58) 
Openness 1.40** 
(3.45) 
1.35** 
(3.53) 
1.28** 
(3.29) 
1.27** 
(3.18) 
2.11** 
(4.79) 
Terms of trade 
Change 
0.10** 
(2.18) 
0.089** 
(2.04) 
0.097** 
(2.20) 
0.09** 
(2.12) 
0.02 
(0.37) 
Investment 0.076** 
(2.99) 
0.087** 
(3.59) 
0.089** 
(3.65) 
0.08** 
(3.49) 
 
Rule of law 0.38** 
(3.58) 
0.415** 
(4.12) 
0.44** 
(4.45) 
0.44** 
(4.35) 
0.25** 
(2.19) 
Resource abundance -8.42** 
(-6.49) 
-3.71 
(-1.84) 
   
Resource abundance 
× Autocracy 
 -0.84** 
(-2.83) 
-1.29** 
(-7.49) 
-1.29** 
(-7.32) 
-1.31** 
(-6.3) 
Resource abundance 
× Democracy 
  -0.46 
(-1.80) 
-0.46 
(-1.73) 
-0.13 
(0.48) 
Autocracy  0.159** 
(2.96) 
0.17** 
(3.26) 
0.17** 
(2.02) 
0.17 
(1.84) 
Democracy    -0.04 
(-0.05) 
-0.02 
(-0.31) 
Equipment     19.3** 
(3.67) 
Observations 74 72 72 72 72 
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.77 
*=significant at 5% level, **=significant at 1% level 
 
In Table 1 we present regression results.  As usual, the dependent variable is the 
average growth rate of real GDP from 1970 to 1990.  The first column replicates the Sachs 
and Warner results using their data, and features the familiar result of a statistically 
negative coefficient for the variable representing resource abundance.  The explanatory 
variables included in Sachs and Warner’s preferred specification are: initial income 
measured by the log of GDP per economically active person in 1970; a measure of the 
degree of openness of the economy; growth of the log of the terms of trade; a rule of law 
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index, the log of the ratio of investment to GDP and resource abundance as measured by 
the share of primary exports in GNP. 
The second column includes an interaction term: [autocracy] × [resource 
abundance].  The theory suggests that resources are detrimental for economic growth when 
the incumbent government does not face political competition, and therefore the interaction 
variable should have a negative sign.  This is consistent with the empirical findings in 
Table 1.  Moreover, note that resource abundance is insignificant at the 5% level after 
including the interaction variable.  This suggests that the political interaction term captures 
the main effect of resource abundance on growth. These results are robust with respect to 
the inclusion of other variables reported by Sachs and Warner. 
As a first robustness check we include in regressions 3 and 4, respectively, variables 
measuring the degree of democracy and autocracy.  Regression 3 reveals that the resource 
term when interacted with democracy, is statistically insignificant at the 5% level, with a 
markedly smaller coefficient than the interaction of resources with autocracy. In regression 
4, democracy is included as an explanatory variable and has an insignificant impact on 
growth.  We have run various model specifications with different explanatory variables 
(such as those included by Barro 1991, King and Levine 1993 and others) and consistently 
find the interaction of resources with autocracy is large, negative and significant, but that 
democracy has a negative effect on growth and autocracy has a positive effect on growth 
(albeit these are not always significant).  The latter finding is intriguing and perhaps 
disappointing, but it is not uncommon in the literature (for an overview of early studies, see 
Przeworski and Limongi 1993; for more recent work, see for example Barro 1996, Minier 
1998, Durham 1999).  The literature provides a number of reasons why democracy can be 
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bad for economic growth, but there is no clear consensus on this issue yet.28  Przeworski 
and Limongi suggest that democracies can be beneficial for growth because democratic 
institutions constrain “predatory” tendencies of the ruling class, which might harm 
investment and growth.  The theory and empirical results in this paper suggest a link 
between such predatory behavior and resource abundance.  Finally, in column 5 we use 
investment spending on equipment as a fraction of GDP as an explanatory variable instead 
of the Sachs-Warner measure of investment.  A number of the Sachs-Warner explanatory 
variables turn insignificant at the 5% level, as does the interaction between resource 
abundance and democracy.  However, the interaction of resource abundance with 
autocracy remains highly significant and negative.  This general finding appears to be 
robust and holds in various other empirical growth models that were tested also (see the 
Appendix for further empirical tests). 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
We develop a model that combines the rent seeking and lobbying efforts of firms with the 
strategic behaviour of a corrupt government, and discuss the conditions under which the 
well-known ‘resource curse’ result obtains.  By combining both firm and government 
incentives the model extends earlier work.  The focus on lobbying and bribing is 
appropriate in light of recent empirical findings that suggest that the main effect of 
resources on economic growth is through the level of corruption that distorts policies (Leite 
and Weidmann 1999).  
                                                 
28 For example, Persson and Tabellini (1992) highlight the growth-retarding effect of redistributive taxation in 
democracies, and Przeworski and Limongi (1993) argue that investment may be facilitated by unpopular 
“strong measures” implemented with an “iron hand”—not necessarily the policies chosen by democratic 
leaders who fret about re-election. There is also anecdotal support that autocracy might have economic 
benefits.  For instance in a recent review of the Malaysian economy the Economist (5 April 2003, p11) notes 
that “There are some advantages to democratic dictatorship as practiced in Malaysia. If necessary, a 
government can take action with a degree of dispatch that leaves more pluralistic systems for dead.”  
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In our model, the curse may materialise because entrepreneurial talent re-allocates 
among sectors in an inefficient way, and the government (responding to bribes) implements 
policies that do not maximize economic growth.  Following a resource boom, resource 
firms find that the marginal value product of government support has gone up and lobby for 
more support.  At the same time, unless mitigated by policy, entrepreneurial talent will 
move from manufacturing to extraction, lowering the marginal value product of 
government support for the manufacturing sector.  In the absence of political competition, a 
resource boom induces the incumbent government to stray away from the income 
maximising path.  But resource booms are not always bad for growth – see Mehlum et al 
(2002).  Whether it is feasible to purchase policies that trigger a “resource curse” is 
determined by the presence or absence of political competition (proxied by a measure of 
democracy), and the associated costs implied by a regime change.  The empirical evidence 
that we present appears to be consistent with our theoretical predictions.   
Interestingly, recent work by political scientists like Ross (1999, 2001) suggests that 
the degree of democracy is not invariant with respect to resource endowments.  Countries 
well-endowed with so called ‘point resources’ (such as oil fields and mines) are more likely 
to be characterized by autocratic leadership – accentuating the main insights of our model. 
 One key result of our paper is to suggest that resource booms may lead to under-
provision of semi-public goods that are important for manufacturing.  For example, it is 
commonly assumed that manufacturing requires the use of human capital, which depends 
upon the provision of a semi-public good such as  ‘education’.  Gylfason (2001) has 
emphasized and discussed the inverse statistical relation between resource abundance and 
‘education.’  While Gylfason argues that “underrating” or “overlooking” the need for good 
economic policies may cause such a policy response, our model suggests that resource 
booms might be logically linked to low education through rent seeking and corruption. 
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Appendix 1: Proofs of propositions 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Let * denote variables in the (constrained) welfare maximising equilibrium. In an autocracy 
λ = 0.  Substitute (7) in (17), and compare the the FOCs for BM (15) and (17) when λ = 0: 
(15) 
* * * * *
*
* * * * * *
( ) 0.
M M M A M M
M M
M M M M M M
dW Q C B L Q QN w N
dB B B B B Q
−∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − + + =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
(17) 0)( =∂
∂−



∂
∂−∂
∂= M
MM
M
M
M
M
M
Ma B
BC
B
lw
B
QN
dB
dW  
Note that w(∂LM/∂BM) = - w(∂LA/∂BM).  Clearly 
* *
*
( )M M
M
C B
B
∂
∂  > 
M
M
C
B
∂
∂ .  Since C
M is convex 
it follows that BM* > BMa.  By a similar comparison of FOCS (14) and (16) it follows that 
BR* = BRa. 
 
For the proof of Proposition 1 we derive the following results:  
We may partially differentiate condition (18), and by using the first order conditions (16) 
and (17) we obtain: 
(a1) 2R
R
M
R N
Q
dN
dZ π+−= − > 0;29 
(a2) R
R
N
Q
dp
dZ −= < 0; 
(a3) M
M
M
M
M
M Q
Q
B
QN
dB
dZ
∂
∂
∂
∂−=
−
)1( > 0; 
(a4) .0=RdB
dZ  
Note that the following holds (from differentiation 20): 
(a5) 


 +∂
∂
∂
∂−=
−
1)1(* M
M
M
M
M
M Q
Q
B
QN
dB
dZ > 0; 
(a6) .R
R
RR B
Q
N
p
dB
dZ
∂
∂−=  
                                                 
29 The sign of (19a) follows from the stability conditions – for a stable interior solution we need that πM will 
cut πR from below (when plotting πM and πR against NR). 
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Comparing (a3-4) to (a5-6) we find that: 
(a7) MM dB
dZ
dB
dZ >* ; and 
(a8) RR dB
dZ
dB
dZ >* . 
Totally differentiating (16) and (17), holding NR constant, yields: 
(a9) 0=
dp
dBM  
(a10) 0>−=
RR
M
BB
pB
R
L
L
dp
dB , where L is the Langrangean and .0>∂
∂=
p
QNL
R
R
pBM
 
Further, consider changes in the allocation of entrepreneurs across sectors: 
(a11) 0<−=
MM
RM
BB
NB
R
M
L
L
dN
dB , where .0<∂
∂−= M
M
NB B
QL RM  
(a12) 0>−=
RR
RR
BB
NB
R
R
L
L
dN
dB , where .0<∂
∂= R
R
NB B
QpL RR  
Taken together this gives the following results: 
(a13) 0<=
dp
dN
dN
dB
dp
dB R
R
MM
, and 
(a14) 0>+=
dp
dN
dN
dB
dp
dB
dp
dB R
R
RRR
 
 
Proposition 1 
Define: Bi* is the welfare maximizing level of public goods provided to sector i=M,R. 
Bi is the level of public goods supplied to sector i=M,R under autocracy. 
Since (from a7) MM dB
dZ
dB
dZ >* , we know that 
dp
dB
dp
dB MM >
*
.  So it follows that 
with a resource boom (or resource discovery) the level of support for manufacturing 
declines and the change is greater than in the welfare maximising equilibrium. 
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Similarly (from a8) RR dB
dZ
dB
dZ >*  holds, so that 
dp
dB
dp
dB RR >
*
 is also true.  As a 
result, the equilibrium shifts further from the welfare maximum – the pre-existing policy 
distortion is accentuated as p increases. 
Consider next the impact on private sector welfare (analogous in this model to 
private sector GDP).  An increase in the resource price leads to a decline in profits of 
individual firms in the manufacturing sector because of the decline in government support 
and the migration of firms to the resource sector: 
{{ {{ {{
( ) 0
M M M M M M M
M M M
d d dB d dN dN dB
dp dB dp dN dp dB dp
π π π
+ + +− − −
= + + < . 
The impact on the resource sector is given by: 
{{ {{ {{
( ) ( )0
R R R R R R R
R R R
d d dB d dN dN dB
dp dB dp dN dp dB dp
π π π
+ + ++ + +
= + + < ≥ . 
By the arbitrage condition in equation (18), equilibrium is restored by the 
movement of firms until profits across sectors are equalised: 0
M Rd d
dp dp
π π< = .  It follows 
that the profits of firms in the resource sector must also decline (entry by entrepreneurs 
from manufacturing implies the individuals’ share of the resource pie falls, restoring 
equilibrium).  Moreover aggregate payments to labour are unaffected by price changes in 
the resource sector ( ) 0d wL
dp
= .  It follows that aggregate private sector welfare declines:  
wLNwLNNW RRMMp +=++= πππ ; and 
.0<=
dp
dN
dp
dW p π  
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Appendix 2: Robustness Checks 
In this Appendix we check the robustness of our main results.  First, we investigate whether 
the qualitative predictions of the model continue to hold using Vanhanen’s alternative 
measure of democracy.30  The Vanhanen index only measures (two) attributes of 
democracy (political participation and political competition), hence it is not possible to test 
for variations in growth across autocratic characteristics of regimes. Proposition 2 suggests 
that in more democratic systems, resource endowments are more likely to have a positive 
impact upon growth.  This suggests that the Vanhanen’s index of democracy could have a 
positive and significant effect on growth.  This is confirmed by the regression results 
below.  While resource endowments in general have a negative effect on growth, 
interacting the resource term with the democracy variable, it has a positive and significant 
effect.  The negative coefficient on the resource term may reflect omitted variable bias 
stemming from the neglect of autocratic effects: 
 
Table A1: Regression results (t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Regression 1 
Initial income level -1.83** 
(-8.17) 
Openness 1.50** 
(3.75) 
Terms of Trade Change 0.076 
(1.57) 
Investment 0.080** 
(3.13) 
Rule of Law 0.35** 
(3.45) 
Resource abundance -11.63** 
(-6.36) 
[Resource abundance] × [Vanhanen Index of Democracy] 0.29** 
(2.29) 
Vanhanen Index of Democracy -0.031 
(-1.81) 
 
Observations 
 
76 
Adjusted R2 0.752 
 
 
As an alternative check of our results we divide the sample into democratic and autocratic 
countries and assess the differential effects of resource endowments across regime types.  
In Table A2 countries are classified in terms of their Marshall and Jaggers (2003) so-called 
“polity score.”  This summary measure is obtained by subtracting the autocracy score from 
the democracy score. (defined as polity score = democratic index – autocratic index).  
Countries with a polity score from 0 to 10 are considered democratic (column 1) and those 
                                                 
30 Hence there are notable differences between the Vanhanen and Polity indices.  For instance, a country such 
as Malaysia, which subscribes to the democratic process, has a high level of voter participation and political 
competition. It therefore scores relatively well on the Vanhanen democracy index. However, the authoritarian 
elements of the regime (such as lack of openness of executive recruitment and lack of constraints on the chief 
executive) give it a much lower score on the Polity index. 
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with a score from –1 to –10 are classified as autocratic (column 2).  We replicate the Sachs-
Warner regressions with this partition of the sample in Table 2 below: 
 
Table A2: Regression results for democratic and autocratic regimes 
 Democratic Autocratic 
Initial income -1.37** 
(-4.88) 
-1.86** 
(-6.05) 
Resources -2.96 
(-1.57) 
-9.60** 
(-5.83) 
Openness 1.21** 
(2.35) 
1.88** 
(3.07) 
Investment 0.10** 
(3.26) 
0.05 
(1.32) 
Terms of trade -0.01 
(-0.20) 
0.16** 
(2.58) 
Rule of Law 0.27 
(1.88) 
0.54** 
(3.67) 
 
Observations 
Adjusted R2 
 
36 
.626 
 
37 
.856 
 
In autocratic regimes (column 2) resources have a statistically significant and negative 
effect on growth, which confirms Proposition 1. In contrast, in regimes classified as 
“democratic,” this effect is statistically insignificant at even the 10% level.  This is 
consistent with Proposition 2.  
 Finally there remains the possibility that resource endowments influence the type of 
political system that eventuates.  For instance, it could be argued that resources induce 
extreme forms of political patronage and favouratism, which in turn lead to more autocratic 
forms of governance.  In this case, resource endowments and political regime type would 
be expected to be strongly correlated – rendering our estimates unreliable.  However, there 
is little evidence of any multicollinearity between ‘regime type’ and ‘resource abundance’.  
The correlation coefficient between resources and: (i) autocracy is 0.255; (ii) democracy is 
0.261, (iii) the polity index is 0.23, and (iv) the Vanhanen index is 0.2461.   
 
